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1.1	 Introduction
This publication seeks to establish a background for understanding the 
complex and dynamic linkages between urbanization, migration, HIV/AIDS 
and urban food security in Southern and Eastern Africa (SEA). As urbaniza-
tion accelerates, direct food transfers from rural areas are increasing as poor 
urban households seek to reduce their vulnerability to high food prices and a 
cash-intensive urban existence. At the same time, urban households or indi-
vidual migrants remit money back to households in rural areas both inside and 
outside the country of employment. A significant proportion of remittances 
are used for consumption purposes, including the purchase of food.1 These 
processes are underwritten by various forms of rural-urban, cross-border and 
circulatory migration. 
Migration has clearly facilitated the rapid spread of HIV in the SEA region 
over the last two decades.2 For a number of reasons, migrants and other 
mobile people are especially vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. The epidemic, in turn, 
is leading to new forms of migration, including children’s migration and return 
migration of PLWHAs (People Living with HIV and AIDS) to rural areas.3 Not 
only does this lead to a decline in remittances but it places a greater burden 
on rural households. Rural food production for urban household members may 
also be negatively affected by the impact of HIV/AIDS on rural producers. In 
the context of HIV/AIDS, migrants themselves may be unable to pursue other 
food security avenues, including urban agriculture. 
As HIV/AIDS creates both short term and long term intergenerational 
impacts within the framework of its long wave epidemiological pattern, the 
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development context is changing considerably. In order to formulate appro-
priate policy responses, it is therefore imperative to understand the complex 
linkages and transfers of people and commodities which characterize the “new 
social economy of migration” in the SEA.4 At the same time, it is important to 
understand the inter-related connections between migration and HIV/AIDS for 
two basic reasons. First, migrants are a particularly vulnerable group, both to 
HIV infection and to resultant food insecurity. Second, a disease which eats 
away at the fabric of the new social economy of migration will severely test 
the ability of urban and rural areas to provide a secure food supply for their 
populations, both at the aggregate and household levels. 
It is against this backdrop that this publication documents the key dimen-
sions of the complex connections between urbanization, migration, HIV/AIDS 
and food security. There is an existing and growing literature on some of these 
connections; between migration and HIV/AIDS, for example, and between 
HIV/AIDS and rural food security. However, the linkages between HIV/AIDS and 
urban food security are less well-established. In addition, attempts to link both 
HIV/AIDS and urban food security simultaneously with migration are only now 
being considered, and this project is the first to examine these dynamics at the 
regional level. That task is rendered more challenging by the fact that migration 
itself has been undergoing rapid changes in form over the last decade. 
The publication is divided into three sections. It is designed to lay the foun-
dation for further discussion and the articulation of a targeted action research 
agenda which addresses both the knowledge gaps and the policy and program-
ming needs of the region in this field of development.
This paper begins by reviewing the literature on urbanization and migra-
tion in SEA, showing how rapid urbanization is not eliminating migration but 
intensifying its scope and scale. The section also provides an overview of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in SEA and seeks to establish the reciprocal connections 
in the HIV/AIDS and migration nexus. Finally, the section reviews current evi-
dence on the determinants of food security in urban areas. 
The second chapter focuses on the links between migration and HIV/AIDS, 
migration and food security, and HIV/AIDS and food security. Research on 
these sets of linkage is proceeding apace although much more is known about 
the impact of HIV/AIDS on rural than urban food security. 
The third chapter draws together these sets of relationships and outlines the 
key knowledge gaps and emerging research questions for the region. Although 
the research literature is not yet developed in this regard, various conceptual 
models have been devised to help understand these relationships. Although 
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some of these models focus on rural food security and some on urban, this 
paper argues that the distinction is artificial, and that migration is the “missing 
link” between the urban and the rural. Migration links the rural and the urban 
social economies and emphasizes the point that urban food security cannot 
be isolated from rural food security and vice-versa. Finally, the paper proposes 
some next steps in developing a fully fledged and policy-relevant research 
agenda.
1.	 Urbanization	and	Internal	Migration
Urbanization is defined as the process by which an increasing proportion of 
a country’s population lives in urban areas over time. By this definition, Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) is urbanizing faster than any other region. Although the 
urban transition has been relatively recent, more than 50% of SSA’s population 
should be living (permanently or temporarily) in urban areas by 2030.5 Indeed, 
the urban population of SSA is set to more than double between 2000 and 
2020, from 217 million (34.3% of total population) to 487 million (46.2% 
of total population).6 The growth in urban population in many countries of the 
SEA region has been dramatic between 1990 and the latest census. Although 
relative changes cannot be compared outright due to the variable time peri-
ods involved, rates are relatively modest for countries such as Botswana and 
Zambia but reach as high as 6% for Mozambique (Table 1). 
As illustrated in Table 1, for selected countries of SEA, urban growth rates 
exceeded population growth rates for the period 1990-2003. For the 21 year 
period between 1982 and 2003, urbanization increased significantly in most 
countries, with rates more than doubling for Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho and 
Mozambique. This massive growth is reflected in the expansion of the number 
and size of mega-cities. By 2010, SSA will have at least 33 cities which 
exceed a million people. Metropolitan Johannesburg – the second largest 
mega-urban region at 3 million – will be at the core of the Gauteng region, 
which is expected to reach 20 million by 2020.7
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Table 1: Population and Urban Growth Rates 1990-2003 and Urbanization 
1982-2003
Country % Population 
Growth Rate 
1990-2003
% Urban 
Growth Rate 
1990-2003
Urban 
Population (% 
of total) 1982
Urban 
Population (% 
of Total) 2003
Botswana 2.3 3.6 22.5 50.3
Ethiopia 2.3 4.4 10.9 16.6
Kenya 2.4 5.6 17.6 36.3
Lesotho 1.0 4.2 14.6 30.3
Madagascar 2.9 5.1 19.5 31.4
Malawi 2.0 4.4 9.6 15.9
Mozambique 2.2 6.2 14.6 35.6
South Africa 2.0 3.5 48.2 59.2
Uganda 2.9 5.3 9.2 15.3
Zambia 2.2 2.4 39.8 40.3
SSA 2.5 4.6 21.8 36
Source: Kessides8 based on World Development Indicators 2005
Within countries, rates of urbanization in major cities commonly exceed 4 to 
5% per annum. The average primate city had annual growth rates of 5 to 6%, 
for example, while some saw rates of 10%, which means a doubling of city 
populations every ten years (less if annual increases are compounded).
There are four main drivers of urban growth in SSA: natural increase from 
existing urban residents; reclassification of rural as urban areas; internal rural-
urban migration and international (rural-urban and urban-urban) migration. 
Most of the anticipated growth in the size of cities and towns over the next 
three decades will occur because of the transformation and reclassification of 
formerly “rural” settlements on the peripheries of major cities and because of 
natural increase within cities. Although migration is not the central driver for 
rapid urbanization, it plays a major role in the growth of cities as well as in 
strengthening the linkages between rural and urban areas and between the 
cities of the SEA. 
Significantly, circular migration is still the dominant form of migration in 
most African countries. Traditional one-way movements from rural to urban 
destinations are much less important than circular and seasonal migration.9 
In other words, the census-based urbanization figures for countries shown in 
Table 1 include significant numbers of people who are living temporarily in the 
cities and who maintain a rural home or base which they return to on a regu-
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lar basis and keep in close contact with. In West Africa, for example, Gugler 
recently replicated a Nigerian study he originally carried out in 1961 and found 
not only that urban-rural ties continue to be strong but reach beyond immedi-
ate kin to kinship groups, non-kin groups, villages and larger political entities. 
He argues that these ties are prevalent throughout Africa and that rural-urban 
migrants who maintain them and incur their costs are motivated by “present 
or future material rewards, political opportunities, social status and cultural 
commitments.”10 
In order to maintain strong social relations within the village, migrants still 
spend time in villages for weddings, funerals, harvests and business, followed 
by the necessity to spend more time in town to acquire more cash. The circular 
nature of this constant movement back and forth signifies “the simultaneous 
and overlapping presence of urban and rural spaces in migrants’ lives.”11 The 
circular nature of rural-urban migration is also highlighted in several recent 
Southern African studies. In Zimbabwe, by 1994 only half as many migrants 
as in 1988 felt their future lay in Harare, indicating increased insecurity around 
urban life, employment and earning potential among in-migrants.12 The impor-
tance of rural-urban social relations is also highlighted in Andersson’s study of 
Buhera migrants in Harare.13 He argues that the social security of rural-urban 
migrants is not spatially situated in rural agricultural production but rather 
socially situated in the rural-urban network. These networks are expressions of 
socio-cultural dispositions and are a more appropriate lens through which to 
view the motivation behind migration. 
In Lilongwe, although rural-urban migration seldom results in permanent 
urban residence, migrants frequently spend periods of time in urban areas 
in order to improve conditions of life in villages.14 In South Africa, one study 
emphasizes the resilience of urban-rural links even when the rural areas 
are so impoverished that they provide little by way of a livelihood for rural 
households.15 In this case, migration centres on basic needs and income secu-
rity, with job-related migration just one aspect of migrating families’ search; 
infrastructure, social capital and institutional climate all influence migration 
demand. The results of the study indicate the instability of KwaZulu-Natal’s 
rural population, rooted in the collapse of the natural resource base, over-
crowding, violence, dispossession and hardship. 
There is evidence that secondary cities have become important destinations 
for migrants. In Tanzania, migration during the 1980s targeted smaller towns 
(20,000-50,000 population) – where it was easier for urban households to 
secure food – over larger and primate cities.16 Similarly, Owuor’s study on 
urban rural-links between the secondary town of Nakuru in Kenya and its rural 
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hinterland demonstrates that urban-rural linkages are not only important for 
rural households, but are becoming an important element of the livelihood (or 
survival) strategies of poorer urban households.17
There is also evidence that circular migration between rural and urban areas 
is increasing due to high costs in the city.18 For many of the disenfranchised, 
such as landless peasants or those exposed to shocks of violence, depriva-
tion and uncertainty, rural-rural migration is quite significant.19 Significantly, 
the Namibia Migration Project found that at the national level, rural-rural 
migration accounted for half of all internal lifetime mobility.20 It is important 
to recognize, therefore, that rural and urban boundaries are artificial distinc-
tions to extended or “stretched households”, who often disperse members 
widely to different spaces, locales and economic activities in order to support 
sustainable livelihoods.21 This mobility allows individuals and families to gain 
new experiences and income that can be used when, where and however they 
decide, according to collective and individual strategies. While the household 
is increasingly “stretched” spatially, it is also differentiated internally, not least 
along gender lines. 
The gendered nature of migration drivers and processes needs to be recog-
nized. Internationally, the “feminization” of migration refers more to shifts in 
the character of women’s movements, rather than a dramatic increase in num-
bers (which have always been greater than traditionally recognized). In SEA, 
there are both qualitative and quantitative changes in internal migration under 
way. The absolute number of female migrants has been increasing rapidly. But 
the reasons for migration have also been shifting and diversifying.22 
Gender and age are significant in migration decision-making and selectiv-
ity.23 Where home employment opportunities are limited, women may be more 
apt than males to migrate for employment in order to support other household 
members. This migration may also afford women an escape from social and 
family constraints and provide them with greater independence.24 In addition, 
young men with limited access to family land and waged work may also be 
driven to migrate.25 Within Southern Africa, for example, more women are 
entering the work force and more women are becoming household heads and 
these factors are helping to drive female migration. In South Africa, women 
comprised 30% of the African adult labour migration population in 1993, 
and this had risen to 34% by 1999. Between 1997 and the year 2000, the 
proportion of females among temporary migrants increased from 15% to 25% 
for older adult women and from 5% to 15% for young adult women  – both 
significant increases within a short three year period.26 The primary destina-
tion for young adult women, older adult women and female children is the 
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province of Gauteng, which is the industrial heart of South Africa. Women are 
also moving their families out of rural villages into nearby small towns on a 
permanent basis. 
Data from 2002 reveals that the three main prompts for permanent internal 
migration of adult females are at the start or end of marriage, a move to a new 
dwelling for the household or a move to live with another partner.27 The pre-
dominant driver for temporary female migration in 2002 was for work, which 
constituted the reason for more than 80% of moves of women aged 35 and 
older. Other reasons for temporary migration included for school/study and to 
live with another.28 In Namibia, the increase in female migration to Windhoek 
over the past ten years, and the fact that urban female-headed households are 
poorer on average than any other household type, both indicate the feminiza-
tion of rural poverty.29
Chronic poverty is no longer an exclusively rural problem, however, but is 
increasingly concentrated in urban areas. In SEA, the urban poverty rate is 
within 20% of the rural rate in Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Mozambique. 
At present, at least one third or more of the urban population in Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia is poor.30 Increased 
pauperization, combined with rapid urbanization, has created massive growth 
in the slum population of Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Between 1990 and 
2001, the African urban slum population increased by 65 million, at an aver-
age annual rate of 4.5% compared with a total population growth of 2.7%. By 
2001, 166.2 million people, or 72% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s urban residents, 
were living in slums. Based on these estimates, and without effective interven-
tions, the continent’s slum population may double every 15 years, compared 
with a total population doubling period of 26 years.31
Problems of insecure tenure, overcrowding, and lack of clean water and 
sanitation and resultant health problems are severe and add to social and eco-
nomic vulnerability of urban residents. National and municipal governments 
are under severe pressure to handle the implications of rapid urbanization 
with respect to basic service provision, housing, transportation, health care, 
education and employment – all of this within the constraints of economies 
debilitated by the impacts of structural adjustment programs, globalization, 
and the impact on the labour force and social systems of HIV and AIDS.
Much of the literature on internal rural-urban migration to date has concen-
trated on the remittance of urban goods and cash to the rural areas, with little 
note being taken of social linkages or rural-urban flows of cash, goods and 
produce.32 From the perspective of rural livelihoods, many researchers have 
made the argument that environmental stress due to high population growth 
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fuels rural-urban migration in the context of declining agricultural output.33 
Migration, then, is a means by which rural households can diversify their 
economic base.34 The ways in which rural and urban households are mutually 
tied by social links and relations of reciprocity are not well-articulated in the lit-
erature.35 The new social economy of migration needs to be better understood 
before the implications of HIV/AIDS for food security can be grasped. 
1.	 Cross-Border	Migration
SEA has a long history of cross-border intra-regional migration, dating back 
to the mid-nineteenth century. These movements tended to be rural-urban in 
character but also include urban-urban movements and, particularly in border 
zones, rural-rural movements. Longstanding patterns, forms, and dynamics of 
migration have undergone major restructuring in the last three decades with 
considerable implications for livelihood strategies of the poor and for poverty 
reduction policies. These changes include the following:
• The end of colonialism and apartheid, which were political systems 
designed to control internal migration and exclude most outsiders, have 
produced new opportunities for internal and cross-border mobility and 
new incentives for moving. 
• SEA’s integration into global and continental labour markets and trade 
networks has opened the region up to forms of migration commonly 
associated with globalization (such as temporary work schemes and skills 
migration.)36 
• Growing rural poverty has pushed more people out of rural households in 
search of a livelihood. 
• Environmental factors (including climate change, natural disasters and 
land degradation) continue to cause hardships and shocks which push 
people out of rural areas.
• Economic and political crisis and growing unemployment in some states 
have forced people to seek work in other countries.
• The feminization of poverty in rural SEA has produced a significant gen-
der reconfiguration of cross-border migration streams.37 
• The countries of the SEA have experienced recurrent waves of forced 
(refugee) migration over the last three decades. The cessation of threat 
confronts countries of origin and asylum with issues of repatriation and 
integration of returning migrants.
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According to the latest UN estimates, there are more than 14 million 
international migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa. East Africa hosts 4.4 million 
international migrants, many of whom are refugees from Ethiopia and the 
Sudan.38 Within Southern Africa, the number of foreign-born migrants in South 
Africa was over 1 million in 2001. Short-term legal visitors to South Africa 
from other Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries also 
increased more than tenfold after 1990 to more than seven million per year 
at the present time.39 
The states of SEA are conventionally divided into migrant-origin (e.g. 
Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho, Zimbabwe) and migrant-destination states 
(e.g. South Africa, Botswana, Namibia). In practice, most states both send 
and receive migrants, though in varying numbers. Several international migra-
tion streams can be identified in the SEA. All have been undergoing significant 
change including:
• Restructuring of traditional contract labour systems
• Growth in the volume and complexity of cross-border mobility
• Declining levels of legal migration to and within the region
• Expansion in undocumented migration and human trafficking
• Increase in skills brain drain from the region
• Large-scale resettlement and reintegration of refugees
• Feminization of cross-border migration
• Growth in intra-regional informal cross-border trade
• Rapid urbanization and growing cross-border urban-urban migrant net-
works
Legal and undocumented cross-border migration throughout SEA has 
exploded in the last decade. The pressure on limited border control resources 
has been enormous with long delays and inefficiency experienced at many bor-
der posts. Corruption is an endemic problem at many posts as travelers seek 
to bypass cumbersome and time consuming bureaucracies and gain unlawful 
entry. In addition, the region has experienced a major influx from other parts 
of the continent as well as significant growth in tourism arrivals from overseas. 
Intra-regional tourism has also grown to significant levels.
The reasons for the new mobility are many and varied (Table 2). The major-
ity of intra-regional migrants to South Africa do not, contrary to popular opin-
ion, enter to work or to look for work. Representative SAMP surveys of migrants 
in 6 SADC countries reveal a multiplicity of motives.40 Cumulatively, in 6 
SADC countries less than 25% went to South Africa to work or look for work. 
However, there was considerable inter-country variation: Mozambique (67%), 
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Zimbabwe (29%), Lesotho (25%), Namibia (13%) and Swaziland (9%). 
Other major reasons included: visiting/tourism (Namibia and Swaziland 58%), 
Lesotho (36%), Mozambique (17%), and Zimbabwe (16%); and trading and 
shopping (Zimbabwe (42%), Lesotho (22%); Swaziland (12%), Mozambique 
(6%), and Namibia (3%). Other reasons included to study, conduct business, 
and seek medical treatment.
Historically, the primary form of legal cross-border migration for employ-
ment (labour migration) in Southern Africa was male migration to the mines 
of South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and the commercial farms and plan-
tations of South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. By the 1990s, only the 
South African gold and platinum mines continued to employ large numbers 
of foreign migrants; other mining sectors in South Africa (such as coal min-
ing) and elsewhere in the region (Zambia, Zimbabwe) had moved to a local 
and/or more stabilized workforce.41 During the 1990s, the South African mines 
experienced major downsizing and retrenchments which created considerable 
social disruption and increased poverty in rural supplier areas. The mines laid 
off local workers at a much faster rate than foreign workers. As a result, the 
proportion of foreign workers rose from 40% in the late 1980s to close to 
60% today. This “externalization” of the workforce was particularly beneficial 
to Mozambique. Mozambicans now make up 25% of the mine workforce, up 
from 10% a decade ago (Table 3).
Table 2: Reasons for Cross-Border Migration to South Africa
Country of Origin
Reason for 
Entry
Botswana 
%
Lesotho 
%
Mozam. 
%
Namibia 
%
Zimbabwe 
%
Work 7 17 45 11 15
Seek work 3 8 22 2 14
Business 6 2 2 8 7
Buy and 
sell goods
2 3 2 2 21
Shopping 24 19 4 1 21
Visit family 23 34 12 13 39
Medical 5 6 4 4 2
Holiday 14 2 5 19 3
Study 3 1 1 3 2
Other 12 8 2 12 3
Source: SAMP POS database at http://www.queensu.ca/samp
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Table 3: Migration to the South African Mines, 1990-2004
Country of Origin
Year S.Africa Botswana Lesotho Mozam. Swaziland Total
1990 232,338 14,497 98,788 43,951 16,618 406,192
1991 208,961 11,979 93,072 46,102 17,291 377,405
1992 185,177 12,000 92,727 49,022 16,157 355,083
1993 175,158 11,827 87,326 44,255 15,802 334,368
1994 170,876 10,939 87,248 49,250 15,101 334,414
1995 123,038 9,525 87,098 53,321 14,611 287,593
1996 126,762 9,608 80,485 54,891 14,241 285,987
1997 126,326 8,552 71,415 52,520 11,980 270,793
1998 104,483 7,229 56,132 49,507 9,518 226,869
1999 95,923 5,376 44,958 42,002 6,308 194,567
2000 95,146 5,373 50,472 44,245 8,079 203,315
2001 99,260 4,763 49,477 45,893 7,840 207,233
2002 115,824 4,227 54,154 51,355 8,697 234,257
2003 112,438 4,205 54,478 53,828 7,970 232,919
2004 120,146 3,924 48,962 48,918 7,598 180,586
Source: SAMP POS database at http://www.queensu.ca/samp
Remittance levels have remained stable in Mozambique but fell during the 
1990s to many areas, especially Lesotho, Swaziland and the Eastern Cape. 
This has presented a major challenge for households formerly reliant on mine 
remittances. Poverty levels have increased, as have domestic and family ten-
sions. Other family members, particularly women, have begun to migrate in 
response. Various efforts have been made to soften the impacts of retrench-
ments but the overall impact has been devastating for rural areas and house-
holds once reliant on migrant remittances.
The migrant stream that attracts most public, media and official attention is 
“undocumented”, “illegal” or “irregular” migration.42 Irregular migration tends 
to be driven by economic circumstances and, in some cases, desperation. 
Enforcement in all countries tends to focus on identifying and deporting viola-
tors. In terms of sheer volume, South Africa is easily the regional leader, having 
deported over one million people since 1994.43 Significantly, the vast majority 
of deportees from South Africa (upwards of 80%) are sent home to only two 
countries: Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Studies of sectors where irregular 
migrants are employed have revealed consistent violation of labour standards, 
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sub-minimum wages, economic and sexual exploitation, and great instability 
and fear among migrants. These sectors include commercial agriculture in rural 
areas and construction, services and secondary industry in the cities.44 
SAMP research has shown that the majority of cross-border migrants in 
Southern Africa are also circular migrants.45 In other words, although many 
migrants stay for longer than initially intended their visits are generally tempo-
rary not permanent. Across a whole range of indices, migrants prefer living in 
their own countries. The major migrant-receiving countries are seen as supe-
rior only in terms of employment and economic opportunity and, sometimes, 
health facilities. In every other respect – personal and family safety, educa-
tional opportunities, access to land, cultural life and so on – home countries 
are viewed as preferable. The obvious conclusion is that economic stability and 
growth at home would be the single most important factor in slowing labour 
migration across borders. 
Like internal migration, cross-border migration in Southern Africa is pro-
foundly gendered. In the colonial period, women were generally prohibited from 
migrating. As the primary reason for migration in the region was wage employ-
ment, men dominated internal and cross border migration. Today women and 
men are differently involved in and affected by migration. Although women are 
increasingly part of the movement of skilled migrants within the region and 
out of it, and have proportionally higher educational levels than male migrants, 
they are more likely to be involved in less skilled and informal work. They are 
also more likely to be irregular migrants, with attendant disadvantages, as it is 
harder for them to access legal migration channels.46 Women are migrants in 
their own right, as well as partners of migrant male spouses.47 
A SAMP study found that male respondents were more likely to have been 
to South Africa than female (Mozambique: 41% of men and 9% of women; 
Zimbabwe: 25% and 20%; Lesotho: 86% and 76%).48 But the reasons for 
migration tend to differ along gender lines (Table 4).
The main sectors of employment for women include agriculture (particularly 
seasonal work), domestic work, the service sector and trade. Men are more 
likely to have formal employment, particularly in the industrial (especially min-
ing), agricultural and construction sectors. Women migrants were more likely 
to be disadvantaged by the migration experience than their male counterparts. 
They are more likely to be single or widowed, but less likely to be in formal sec-
tor employment or to own property than their male counterparts.49 Migration is 
a significant livelihood strategy for women and women-headed households.50 
Although women constitute a significant part of cross border and internal 
migratory movement, they are also left behind as employment and earning 
opportunities favour men. 
LINKING	MIGRATION,	HIV/AIDS	AND	URBAN	FOOD	SECURITY	IN	SOUTHERN	AND	EASTERN	AFRICA
|1|
Table 4: Gender Differences in Migration to South Africa from 6 SADC 
States
Purpose of Most Recent Visit to SA % Males % Females
Work 33 7
Look for work 17 3
Business 3 3
Buy and sell goods 4 10
Shop 13 23
Visit family/friends 17 38
Holiday 3 3
Medical 2 8
Other 8 5
Source: SAMP database, http://www.queensu.ca/samp
Another particularly common, and growing, form of women’s migration is 
motivated by opportunities for trading in other countries. Indeed, the urban 
areas of the SEA are being increasingly integrated into transnational conti-
nental and regional informal trade networks.51 Informal traders or small entre-
preneurs are amongst the most enterprising and energetic of contemporary 
migrants. Trading is a key means of livelihood for many households in some 
countries and needs to be better understood and, wherever possible, facilitated 
by policy changes governing entrance, exit and customs duties. Informal sector 
cross border trade is important to the transfer of goods and commodities in 
the region. Initial studies of informal cross-border trade in the region suggest 
that it:
• Is significant to the movement of food and agricultural goods in the 
region,
• Plays a role in regional food security,
• Plays a part in the development of small and medium enterprises,
• Is a household livelihood strategy particularly for female-headed house-
holds,
• Engages a significant number of women, 
• Constitutes a significant proportion of cross-border traffic in the SADC 
and COMESA regions,
• Has been largely ignored by policy makers who have yet to engage with 
this trade.52
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However, more needs to be known and understood about the extent of 
informal sector cross border trade in the region and its role in livelihood strate-
gies and food security, and an income earning opportunity for women. Further 
research is required to better understand the relationship between these 
entrepreneurs their businesses, poverty alleviation, agricultural commodity and 
consumption chains and food security. Furthermore, research could inform the 
development of training programs to enable them to develop their businesses 
as well as access financial resources. 
Cross-border migration has a strong relationship to poverty, social exclusion, 
and poverty alleviation.53 Data on the remittance behaviour of cross-border 
migrants and receiving households is limited. Similarly, little information is 
available on their impact on national economies, economic development, 
inequality and financial systems in the region.54 Furthermore, remittances 
in the form of goods are not recorded. Data on cash remittances is hard to 
gather as foreign exchange regulations, weak financial infrastructures and high 
transfer costs in formal systems encourage the use of informal channels for 
transferring money. 
Despite the lack of reliable data, it is apparent that remittances to home 
areas do contribute significantly to household livelihoods and food security. 
Remittances may be in goods or cash. Remittances can play a key role in the 
livelihoods of migrant households allowing for social, or human capital invest-
ment in education, health and housing and food. They may also be used as 
capital to invest in income earning household inputs and to capitalize entre-
preneurial activities. 
1.	 The	HIV/AIDS	Epidemic
As Iliffe and Gillespie have both indicated, AIDS epidemics are multi-dimen-
sional, long-term, phased phenomena.55 The first wave of HIV infection is fol-
lowed by a wave of opportunistic infections, tuberculosis being the most com-
mon. The onset of AIDS illness and death occurs several years later. In the final 
stage, depending on the prevalence of the disease and availability of treatment, 
there is an accumulation of macroeconomic and social impacts at household, 
community and national levels. At the local level, Barnett and Topouzis identify 
three main stages that a community may pass through: 56 
a)  AIDS initiating; with very low HIV prevalence rates and no AIDS 
impacts,
b)  AIDS-impending; where HIV prevalence rates are rising but most infected 
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people are still in the asymptomatic phase before becoming ill, and 
c) AIDS-impacted; when households and communities feel the impact of 
AIDS as infected people succumb to AIDS-related illnesses and eventually 
die.
In the context of the global epidemic, Africa remains the most affected 
region, with 25.8 million people living with HIV (Table 5). Even though Africa 
is home to just over 10% of the world’s population, two thirds of people liv-
ing with HIV are in Africa, as are 77% of all women with HIV. In 2005, an 
estimated 2.4 million adults and children died from AIDS-related illnesses and 
another 3.2 million became infected with HIV. 
Table 5: HIV and AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2003-2005
Year Adults & 
children 
living with 
HIV
Adults & 
children 
newly 
infected 
with HIV
Adult 
preval- 
ence (%)
Adult 
& child 
deaths 
due to 
AIDS
No. of 
women 
(15-49) 
living with 
HIV
% HIV-
infected 
adults (15-
49) who 
are female
2005 25.8  
million
3.2  
million
7.2 2.4  
million
13.5  
million
57
2003 24.9  
million
3.0  
million
7.3 2.1  
million
13.1  
million
57
Source: Compiled from UNAIDS, 2005
 
Declines in adult national HIV prevalence have been recorded in just three 
countries: Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe.57 Life expectancy for people living 
in eight countries (Angola, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) is forty years or less, largely 
due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In 20 countries, average citizens are poorer 
today than they were a decade ago and in 11 countries more people go hungry 
than they did a decade ago.58
Table 6 shows the number of persons living with HIV/AIDS and emphasizes 
the fact that even where prevalence rates are much lower, hundreds of thou-
sands to millions of people are still affected. South Africa leads the way with 
5.3 million persons, followed by Zimbabwe at 1.8 million, and then Tanzania, 
Ethiopia, Mozambique and Kenya, all of which are over 1 million, with 
Malawi and Zambia both approaching 1 million. Access to ARTs vary widely 
within each country: at least one third of those who need ART in Botswana 
and Uganda are receiving treatment, while in Zambia, Kenya, and Malawi 
10-20% of those in need of ART were receiving it by mid-2005. Most needs 
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went unmet. In South Africa, by mid 2005, at least 85% of those who needed 
ART were not receiving any, and this figure was 90% or higher for Ethiopia, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.59 
As Table 6 shows, with the exception of Cape Town, urban HIV prevalence 
far exceeds national HIV prevalence and in many Eastern African countries the 
urban rate is two to three times the rural HIV rate. As established above, cities 
and towns are growing at exceptional rates, with rapid expansion of informal 
settlements. Hundreds of thousands of people are forced to live in conditions 
without basic services, security of tenure and in extreme overcrowding. These 
conditions enhance personal vulnerability and lead to much higher HIV preva-
lence.
Table 6: National and Urban HIV Prevalence in Southern and Eastern 
Africa, 2005
Country National HIV 
Prevalence Rate
Urban HIV 
Prevalence Rate
People Living With 
HIV/AIDS
Zimbabwe 21% (2004) Harare 25% 1,800,000
South Africa 21.5% (2003 est.) Cape Town 15% 
Durban 28%
5,300,000
Malawi 20% Blantyre 28% 900,000
Mozambique 16% Maputo 17.3% 1,300,000
Zambia 16.5% (2003 est.) Lusaka 22% 920,000
Namibia 21.3% (2003 est.) Windhoek 24% 210,000
Uganda 7% Kampala >9% 530,000
Kenya 7% Busia/Meru/Nakura/
Thika 9%
1,200,000
Tanzania 7% Urban 11%  
(2x rural areas)
1,600,000
Rwanda 5.1% (2003 est.) Urban 6.4%  
(rural 2.8%)
250,000
Burundi 6% Bujumbura suburb 
13%
250,000
Ethiopia 4.4% Urban 12-13% 1,500,000
Somalia 0.6% Mogadishu 0.9% 43,000
Sources: UNAIDS 2005; The World Factbook 2005.
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1..1		 Southern	Africa
Southern Africa remains the epicenter of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, with high 
HIV prevalence rates throughout the region, excepting Angola. The only 
national epidemic in the region which shows some evidence of ebbing is in 
Zimbabwe. Here, data from a national surveillance system shows that HIV 
prevalence among pregnant women dropped from 26% in 2002 to 21% in 
2004 (although the role of unreliable government statistics in this decrease 
is not known). At 1.7 million people, and a poverty rate of 70%, the capi-
tal city of Harare has an overall HIV prevalence rate of 25%. However, HIV 
prevalence in women who attended antenatal or postnatal clinics dropped 
from 35% in 1999 to 21% in 2004 in Harare. Even though the rate of new 
infections could be slowing and mortality rates leveling off, 20% of pregnant 
women still test HIV positive and infection levels remain amongst the world’s 
highest.60 Nationally, life expectancy at birth dropped from 51.8 years in 1995 
to 38.2 years in 2001. The WHO recently reported that Zimbabwean women 
now have the shortest average life expectancy in the world at 34 (compared 
with Zimbabwean males at 37). Although the WHO attributes this solely to 
HIV/AIDS, Zimbabwean doctors indicate that the failed health care system (in 
the midst of severe economic and political crisis) has meant that more women 
are dying from pregnancy and childbirth.61
In Bulawayo, the country’s second largest city with a population close to one 
million, between 1990 and 2000, the overall death rate of 13.7 (per thousand 
population) had more than doubled, and HIV-related diseases were the lead-
ing cause of death in all age groups from 1 to 64 years.62 Between 1995 and 
2001, life expectancy in Bulawayo dropped by more than a decade from 52.4 
to 41.2 years.63
The Zimbabwe situation has been further exacerbated by the Government's 
Operation Restore Order (Operation Murambatsvina), a major nationwide 
demolition and eviction program which started in Harare and spread to all 
other urban centres in 2005. With the demolition of thousands of homes, 
business premises and vending sites, it is estimated that 700,000 people 
lost their homes, their livelihoods or both, and indirectly another 2.4 million 
people were affected. Hundreds of thousands have been rendered homeless, 
without access to any basic services, and education for thousands has been 
disrupted. This disproportionately affected the poor and disadvantaged, who 
are now deeper into poverty and more vulnerable. Many of the sick, including 
those with HIV and AIDS, no longer have access to health care.64 There is a 
major concern that increased vulnerability and population mobility, including 
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spousal separation and livelihood insecurity, could negatively impact the HIV/
AIDS epidemic.65
In South Africa, HIV prevalence among pregnant women has reached its 
highest level yet: 29.5% of women attending antenatal clinics were HIV posi-
tive in 2004.66 More than one in three women aged 25-34 and almost one 
in three women aged 20-24 were estimated to be living with HIV. The worst-
affected province is KwaZulu-Natal, with a prevalence of 40%, but prevalence 
is also high, between 27% and 31%, in the Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, 
Mpumalanga and North West provinces. The incredible speed of the evolution 
of the epidemic in South Africa – with national adult HIV prevalence at less 
than 1% in 1990 increasing to almost 25% by 2000, has meant a concomi-
tant increase in mortality: Death rates of those 15 years and older increased 
by 62% from 1997-2002 and deaths in the 25-44 age group more than 
doubled during that time. At present, South Africa experiences an estimated 
900 deaths a day from the epidemic.67 Urban HIV prevalence rates cover a 
wide range: Cape Town (population 2 million) has a prevalence of 15% while 
Durban (population of 3 million) has a 28% prevalence rate. The Actuarial 
Society of South Africa estimates that it will be another 10 years before the 
pandemic breaks.68
Exceedingly high prevalence rates – often over 30% for pregnant women – 
are still recorded in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. In Swaziland, 
HIV prevalence among pregnant women increased from 34% in the year 2000 
to 43% in 2004. Prevalence is even higher at 56% among pregnant women 
in the 25-29 year old group. Within Swaziland, there is little regional variance 
in HIV prevalence among pregnant women and the overall national HIV preva-
lence is 39%.69 In Lesotho, HIV prevalence is 27% amongst antenatal clinic 
attendees, down slightly from 29% in 2003.70 National HIV prevalence has 
reached 31%. Botswana also has a national prevalence rate of 39%, although 
national prevalence among pregnant women has remained between 35% and 
37% since 2001, which may indicate some stabilization. For pregnant women 
25 years and older, prevalence soared to 43% in 2003.71 
Malawi experiences wide regional variation in prevalence from 7% in the 
central region to 33% at the southern tip, with national prevalence around 
20%. Two negative trends here are increasing prevalence at rural clinics 
and rising prevalence amongst young pregnant women (15% for 15-19 year 
olds and 20% for 20-24 year olds).72 In Blantyre, with a population which 
exceeds 700,000 and an urban poverty rate of 54%, the HIV prevalence rate 
is 28%.73
The epidemic in Mozambique is increasing, with rising levels in all regions 
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and an estimated increase in national adult HIV prevalence from 14% to 
slightly above 16% in the 2002-2004 period. In the capital city, Maputo, with 
a population of 966,837, HIV prevalence is 17.3%. Population migration and 
mobility is a driving force, since HIV is spreading faster in provinces which 
have main transport links with Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe. High 
infection rates are also evident in Gaza province, which borders Zimbabwe and 
South Africa, and is a major source of migrants for South African industry and 
farms, and in Sofala province, which is divided by Zimbabwe’s main export 
route.74
In Zambia, HIV prevalence among 15-44 year old pregnant women has 
remained at 18-20% since 1994. However, rising prevalence for 15-19 year-
olds attending antenatal clinics between 1998 and 2002 indicate that new 
infections continue to occur at significant rates. In the capital city of Lusaka 
(population 1.6 million), there is a 52% urban poverty rate and an HIV preva-
lence of 22%. Altogether, urban residents are twice as likely as rural residents 
to be infected with HIV. The highest levels of infection are once again tied 
to population mobility and are tied to cities and towns situated along major 
transport routes. This includes Kabwe, Kapiri, Mposhi, Livingstone and Ndola, 
where 22-32% of pregnant women were HIV positive in 2002.75
Angola has the lowest HIV prevalence rate within the region with an esti-
mated 2.8% of pregnant women testing positive. However, the capital city 
of Luanda had reached a prevalence of 4.4% in 2004. A prevalence rate of 
33% has been found amongst commercial sex workers, indicating potential 
for major epidemic growth.76 The highest prevalence is located in the two 
provinces of Cunene and Kuando-Kubango, both of which share a border with 
Namibia, in a region where migration is significant.77
There is considerable geographical variation in levels of HIV prevalence in 
Namibia, from 8.5% in Opuwo in the remote northwest, to 42% in Katima 
Mulilo, which is situated in the Caprivi strip which borders Angola, Botswana 
and Zambia, an area of high mobility. Some parts of Namibia therefore experi-
ence rates equivalent to the worst hit areas of Swaziland, Botswana and South 
Africa. The mobility of the mining and fishing labour force results in high rates 
in the coastal towns of Luderitz, Swakopmund and Walvis Bay (22%-28%).78 
Windhoek, the capital city (population 233,000) has a prevalence rate of 
24%, and has experienced dramatic in-migration since independence in 1990, 
as illustrated in the graph below (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Rural-Urban Migration Trend for Windhoek: 1944-2000
Source: Frayne, B. 2001, note 4.
HIV/AIDS in Urban Southern Africa
Southern	 Africa	 has	 the	 highest	 HIV	 prevalence	 rates	 in	 the	world.	 It	 is	
also	home	to	0%	of	all	global	persons	living	with	HIV/AIDS.	Botswana	and	
Swaziland	 have	 the	 highest	 prevalence	 rates	 in	 the	world	 at	 %	 and	
the	only	country	that	has	shown	any	decrease	 in	prevalence	has	been	
Zimbabwe,	 although	 these	 figures	 are	 questionable	 and	 also	 predate	
the	impact	of	Operation	Restore	Order.	HIV	prevalence	in	urban	areas	is	
higher	than	national	prevalence	levels	as	are	regions	along	borders	and	
transport	 routes	 which	 experience	 high	 levels	 of	mobility.	 These	 serious	
national	AIDS	epidemics	are	set	to	continue	for	some	time.
1..		 East	Africa
Turning to East Africa, although national prevalence within Uganda peaked at 
over 15% in the early 1990s, this has declined and may be the result of a 
major national campaign. At present, national prevalence lies at 7%, although 
it rises to 10% for Ugandans in the 30-39 year group. In urban areas in 
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Uganda, HIV prevalence among women was almost twice as high as men 
(13% versus 7.3%). Overall infection rates were highest for the capital city of 
Kampala (population 1.2 million) at more than 9%, and for the Central and 
North-Central regions.79 Little is documented about the effect of conflict on 
HIV prevalence rates; however, there is currently a RENEWAL study underway 
in Uganda which examines the situation of internally displaced people in the 
refugee camps.80 Moreover, the continued conflict in northern Uganda may 
contribute to a renewed increase of HIV and AIDS in the country, particularly 
amongst children and women.
Kenya’s epidemic peaked in the late 1990s with a national adult prevalence 
of 10%, which dropped to 7% in 2003. Infection levels for urban residents 
peaked in the mid 1990s, prior to that of rural residents, which later dropped 
but at a slower rate than urban areas. Kenya has the distinction of being only 
the second SSA country whose national HIV infection rates have declined 
steadily. The clearest example of this turnaround has been amongst pregnant 
women in the urban centres of Kenya – especially in Busia, Meru, Nakaru 
and Thika – where HIV prevalence dropped from 28% in 1999 to 9% in 
2003. There have also been falls in other urban areas, including the capital, 
Nairobi (population between 3 and 4 million). The decline in Kenya’s national 
prevalence rates can be attributed to several factors, including behavioural 
change, the mature stage of the epidemic where death rates can exceed new 
infection rates, and the deaths of the more at-risk population which removes 
them from the transmission circuit.81 While these declines appear remarkable 
in the broader regional context, it is important to emphasize that in Kenya, as 
elsewhere, prevalence rates vary significantly across the country, potentially 
masking hard-hit communities who may be bypassed by interventions as a 
result.82 For example, the fishing communities of the Lake Victoria Basin have 
a lifestyle that exposes them to viral transmission and their prevalence rates 
of 31% are testimony to this. Similarly disproportionate prevalence rates have 
been recorded among fisherfolk in the adjacent countries of Tanzania and 
Uganda.83
Although the prevalence rate in mainland Tanzania is fairly low at 7%, it is 
twice as high in urban (11%) than in rural areas. Altogether, it is estimated 
that 1.5 million people are living with HIV/AIDS. Although 12 years ago ante-
natal clinic HIV prevalence reached 20% in Mbeya and 36% at some clinics, 
it now appears to have stabilized. Antenatal infection rates have declined in 
Dar es Salaam and Mtware since 2002, but they have risen in the capital 
city of Dodoma (population over 300,000). However, according to a recent 
survey in rural parts of the country, 40% of married men admitted to having 
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extramarital affairs which presents an alarming trend for the possibility of new 
infections.84
Urban areas in Rwanda also mirror patterns found elsewhere, with preva-
lence twice as high as for rural areas (6.4% median prevalence in 2003 
compared with 2.8% for rural areas) and with the capital city of Kigali (2005 
population of 851,024) the worst hit. HIV prevalence fluctuations range widely 
in Burundi, from 2% in Kiremba to 13% in a suburb of the capital city of 
Bujumbura with an estimated national prevalence rate of 6%.85 
Urban HIV prevalence rates in Addis, Ethiopia, are almost three times the 
national level of an estimated 4.4%. Pregnant women in towns and cities 
have had HIV prevalence rates between 12 and 13% since the mid 1990s. 
However, with 85% of the population situated in rural areas, more people in 
rural areas are now being infected than in urban, with rural prevalence increas-
ing from 1.9% in 2000 to 2.6% in 2003.86 While this may be the trend, rural 
poverty is chronic, severe and in many cases worsening with time, raising gen-
eral vulnerability to HIV and AIDS through poverty mitigation (usually survival) 
behaviours involving mobility. For example, women and girls, facing destitution 
from asset losses, move to towns to begin making a living in the commercial 
sex worker industry and expose themselves to HIV.87 The challenges facing 
Ethiopia are significant: there are more than 1.5 million people living with HIV 
(2004) and more than 4.5 million orphans, of whom at least 500,000 are 
AIDS orphans. AIDS caused an estimated 30% of deaths in 2003, and in mid-
2005, fewer than 10% of people who needed ART were receiving it.88 Deaths 
due to AIDS have already brought down life expectancy which was expected to 
fall by 4.6 years in 2003.89 It is noteworthy that in terms of disease stage and 
prevalence rates, Ethiopia is now where South Africa was in 1994.
HIV prevalence rates are low for both Eritrea and Somalia. In 2003, Eritrea 
had a low national adult prevalence of 2.4%, with regional ranges from under 
2% to more than 7%. In Somalia, a 2004 national survey of pregnant women 
recorded an average rate of 0.6%, with the highest infection rates found in the 
capital city of Mogadishu (0.9%).90 With 7% of women attending one clinic 
in Mogadishu found to be HIV positive, it appears that urban concentration 
is once again the dominant pattern. Knowledge of HIV transmission is very 
low, which indicates the need for a prevention and education program, but in 
societies where sexuality and sexual practices are not openly discussed, such 
programs face significant obstacles.
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Urban HIV in Eastern Africa
National	adult	HIV	prevalence	rates	are	much	lower	in	East	African	coun-
tries	compared	with	Southern	African	countries	although	HIV	prevalence	
rates	still	remain	high.	Cities	and	towns	tend	to	exceed	national	and	rural	
prevalence	rates.	Although	epidemics	appear	to	be	stable,	they	remain	
serious	and	will	continue	for	many	years	to	come.	Socio-economic	and	
socio-cultural	factors	which	create	and	enhance	vulnerability	need	to	be	
addressed.	
1.		 Determinants	of	Urban	Food	Security
The right to food has been recognized by various international declarations, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.91 Food security is usu-
ally defined as “access by all people at all times to sufficient food for an active 
healthy life.”92 Definitions of food security usually include food supply, access, 
adequacy, utilization, safety and cultural acceptability of food for all people at 
all times.93 Barrett outlines four major elements of a useful operational concep-
tion of food security:94
• the physiological needs of individuals (nutritional requirements and 
energy expenditure levels);
• the complementarities and tradeoffs among food and other basic neces-
sities (most notably health care and education, among other things);
• changes over time, and people’s perceptions of and responses to these 
changes (for example, consumption smoothing) and, especially; 
• uncertainty and risk (vulnerability, and people’s perceptions and respons-
es to risk).
Food security is no longer viewed as a failure to produce enough food nation-
ally, but rather as a failure of livelihoods to provide an adequate supply at 
the household level.95 Dowler maintains that food insecurity is a synonym for 
food poverty, which reflects the fact that food insecurity goes beyond physical 
efficiency of food consumption to include the ability “to acquire or consume 
an adequate quantity or quality of food in socially acceptable ways, or the 
uncertainty that one will be able to do so.”96 These conceptions are reflected 
in factors which help to measure the degree of food insecurity. A population or 
livelihood group is considered acutely food insecure if:
• people experience a large reduction in their major source of food and are 
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unable to make up the difference through new strategies;
• the prevalence of malnutrition is abnormally high for the time of year, and 
this cannot be accounted for by either health or care factors;
• a large proportion of the population or group is using marginal or unsus-
tainable coping strategies; and
• people are using ‘coping’ strategies that are damaging their livelihoods in 
the longer term, or incur some other unacceptable cost, such as acting 
illegally or immorally.97
Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the world where the number of 
people who live in extreme poverty has almost doubled over the last two dec-
ades: from 164 million in 1981 to 314 million today.98 Chronic urban poverty 
is critically linked with urban food insecurity. As urban areas within SEA grow 
at unprecedented rates, the infrastructure and tax bases of cities cannot meet 
the increased demands for services and this has led to increased crowding and 
a deteriorating urban environment.99 This means that access to health care, 
water, housing and education are all problematic.100 
Levels of urban poverty appear to be increasing in much of Africa. 
Unemployment and underemployment are characteristic of urban economies 
which have been in decline since the 1970s and 1980s, exacerbated by rapid 
urbanization rates.101 Cities and towns are cash-intensive and residents often 
have to pay for goods and services (such as fuel and housing) that they do not 
have to pay for in rural areas. High costs for non-food essentials means that 
urban dwellers spend a smaller proportion of their incomes on food because 
they must pay for goods such as housing, energy, transportation, household 
items, education, health care and personal items.102 Also, prices vary not just 
between rural and urban areas but also between urban areas. 
As poor households struggle to meet urban expenses, the type, quantity and 
quality of food consumption tends to be an area of cut-back since it is not 
viewed as a fixed, absolute expense. Thus, households are thrust into food 
insecurity. Kironde, for example, found that in Tanzania the income needed for 
2000 calories per day was 19.7% higher in towns (excluding Dar es Salaam) 
than rural areas and 98.2% higher in Dar than in rural areas.103 Many recent 
urban poverty assessment studies reaffirm this trend. For example, in Accra, 
Maxwell et al found that urban households buy more than 90% of their food 
and 40% of households could be classified as insecure with respect to calorie 
intake. In low-income settlements in Dhaka, for sake of comparison, 50% of 
the population was below the chronic poverty line and 42% was below a local 
line of minimum food plus 20% for basic necessities.104 
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The analysis of food insecurity is usually focused upon risk factors and 
whether households can cope with shortfalls. In the city, this revolves around 
access to cash for food and basic necessities, which is tied directly to wages 
and prices, but also includes factors such as overcrowding, an unhygienic 
environment and the lack of a functional safety net.105
Food prices are integral to the food security of urban dwellers. Urban retail 
markets in most developing cities are small and scattered, and although this 
may not be efficient, they do serve the needs of the poor, who are forced to buy 
food every day and in small quantities since they lack the cash to buy in bulk. 
For many years, food prices in urban areas were kept cheap through subsidies, 
overvalued exchange rates and trade restrictions. However, structural adjust-
ment programmes during the 1980s and 1990s reversed these policies and 
led to food prices that often increased much faster than wages.106 The urban 
poor are further hampered by their dependence on low wage, casual, tempo-
rary or seasonal work and thus their cash flows are intermittent and influx, 
which directly impacts upon their ability to buy food.
In Southern Africa, in particular, many people are undernourished due to poor 
quality diets and infections. A poor diet usually means inadequate quantities 
of protein, carbohydrates and micronutrients which are all necessary for vari-
ous human functions. Pregnant women who live in environments which lack 
iodine need to consume iodized salt for the normal development of the foetal 
brain. In addition, if people do not consume enough fruits and vegetables, 
deficiencies in vitamins A, C and other nutrients make them more susceptible 
to disease.107 Research in many developing countries shows that poor nutrition 
leads to reduced productivity.108 A recent study by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) in 15 developing countries revealed that poverty 
and malnutrition increase along with urbanization. Using WHO data, the study 
found that the urban share of underweight children increased in 11 of the 15 
countries and the absolute number increased in 9 of the 15 countries.109
Children are particularly vulnerable to the effects of malnutrition and mal-
nourishment. Malnutrition in the form of stunted and underweight children 
worsened in South Africa during the late 1990s.110 A recent UNICEF study of 
childhood nutritional status in Southern Africa over a ten year period showed 
deterioration in conditions in Zimbabwe and Zambia in 2001-2003. Overall, 
2.3 million children were underweight in the 6 countries studied, with more 
than 30% of children in Malawi and Mozambique showing stunted growth. In 
all countries except Lesotho and Swaziland, urban and peri-urban areas started 
with the lowest levels of underweight children but deteriorated the most over 
the ten years, while most rural areas tended to improve.111
Although African cities are growing at an unprecedented rate and urban pov-
erty is back on the agenda with respect to both research and donor priorities, 
Maxwell contends that urban food security has become politically invisible. He 
cites several reasons for this:112
• urban food security is fairly invisible to urban planners and managers as 
they scramble to deal with more urgent visible political issues such as 
unemployment, the informal sector, overcrowding, decaying infrastructure 
and declining services – even though food security and malnutrition are 
all linked to these other problems;
• unless there are major problems with food supply or sudden increases in 
food prices, food insecurity rarely becomes a political issue and therefore 
is dealt with at the household level; and 
• development theory has reinforced the notion that food insecurity and 
poverty are generally rural problems. 
One aspect of urban food security which has largely been ignored in the lit-
erature is that of urban food remittances from extended and immediate family 
in the rural areas. Frayne explores this issue in Namibia, and finds that rural 
sources of food are important for migrant and non-migrant households alike in 
the context of limited employment and high rural-urban migration.113 In this 
study, 66% of Windhoek households had received food over the past year from 
friends and relatives in the rural areas and 58% were sent food from 2-6 times 
in the past year. 
The reciprocity between rural and urban households is key here, with urban 
households sending cash remittances to rural families in the semi-subsistence 
sector which drives the purchase of food and other necessities in the rural 
areas and thereby contributes to the availability of a ‘rural surplus’ for remit-
ting to the urban household. Thus, social networks are the infrastructure that 
enables the flow of goods between rural and urban areas.114 However, there 
are gender differences in amounts and types of food received and for women it 
is the lack of well-established links to the north as well as rights to land that 
account for the fact that they receive smaller amounts of food.
Potts also found in Zimbabwe that households which have access to rural 
production are remitting increasing amounts of food to urban areas.115 In addi-
tion, Oucho reports that it is usually rural households with access to urban 
remittances who are the most productive farmers in East Africa, which may 
apply to Southern Africa. In his study, Oucho found that 48% of urban remit-
tances are used either to buy or improve land and that the strength of ties 
between rural and urban households stimulates the rural economy at both 
household and community levels.116
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 .1	 Migration	and	HIV/AIDS11
Links between HIV/AIDS and migration are complex.118 The highest incidence 
of HIV/AIDS is in the SEA countries with good transport infrastructure, rela-
tively high levels of economic development, and highly mobile populations. 
Migration is tied to the rapid spread and high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the 
following ways: 
• Migrant communities are socially and economically marginalized and 
have high rates of infection; 
• Migrant social and sexual networks make them more vulnerable to infec-
tion; 
• Migration encourages high-risk sexual behaviour; 
• Migrants are harder to reach for preventive education, condom provision, 
HIV testing and treatment and care.119
The incidence of HIV is generally higher among migrants and the sexual 
partners of migrants.120 The infection rate is very high amongst truck drivers 
– over 90% reported in one South African study.121 Border towns have high 
HIV prevalence, as places where truck drivers encounter stable local popula-
tions, and are removed from AIDS intervention programs.122 Refugees and 
internally-displaced persons are also especially vulnerable to HIV infection. 
In linking human mobility and the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS, it is important 
to note that different forms of migration lead to different social and geographi-
cal forms of migrant ‘community’, and thus to different causes and cultures 
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of risk. Where single-sex labour migration is regularized and formalized as 
in the South African mines, migrant communities and an associated migrant 
culture has developed.123 Sex and sexuality are integral components of such 
cultures, including commercial or ‘transactional’ sex and heterosexual as well 
as homosexual relations, in addition to sex with a female partner at ‘home.’ 
Other forms of mobility disrupt or prevent the formation of any stable, place-
based community. People who have multiple ‘homes’, or who spend a lot of 
their time away from or between homes, lead lives of contingent encounters 
and short-term relationships, whether economic, social or sexual. This encour-
ages high-risk sexual behaviour, including obtaining sex on a commercial basis. 
For example, in Zambia, low-income men living away from home for one or 
more months per year are more than twice as likely to die as men living at 
home.124 While ‘on the road,’ women especially are vulnerable to exploitation 
and harassment, which can include sexual assault. In Malawi, poor women 
and girls who undertake cash-earning piecemeal work (ganyu) beyond the 
confines of the village are particularly at risk as transactional sex is increas-
ingly incorporated into ganyu contracts.125 The gender dynamics of migration 
therefore lead to differences between men and women in terms of their risk of 
exposure to HIV.126 
HIV/AIDS is also becoming an increasingly important cause of migration and 
mobility. For example: 
• People with AIDS commonly return to live with family members to obtain 
care; 
• Loss of income though death or debilitation of a migrant encourages 
migration by other household members;
• HIV/AIDS can lead to a decline in rural productivity and food security, 
increasing pressure for out-migration; 
• Replacement of migrant workers with HIV/AIDS with new migrant work-
ers; 
• Migration to avoid stigmatization;
• Migration to obtain health care;
• Skills gaps and shortages could prompt countries to seek replacement 
skills from other countries; 
• AIDS orphans (who may themselves be HIV positive) migrate to live with 
relatives or to seek their own income-earning opportunities;127 
• New widows or widowers (also themselves often HIV positive) may 
migrate upon the death of their partner.
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In drawing attention to the connections between HIV/AIDS and human 
mobility, it is essential not to “stigmatize” migrants as bearers of disease, as 
people to be ‘kept out’ by implementing stricter migration controls. Xenophobia 
further marginalizes already-vulnerable migrant communities and exacerbates 
the socio-economic conditions that contribute to the spread of HIV. Likewise, 
legal restrictions that attempt to prevent migration create clandestine flows 
of people, excluded from access to social and medical services. Instead of 
futile attempts to prevent people from moving, there need to be HIV/AIDS 
interventions, from education and prevention through testing and counseling 
to treatment and care, that are designed for and targeted at particular migrant 
populations. 
There are at least four broad categories of mobile population, each demand-
ing a different form of response:
• Migrant or immigrant communities of people who have left one place to 
settle in another, either long-term or permanently. They require focused 
interventions in their new location until such time as they become fully 
integrated into their new societies; 
• Trans-migrants who have ‘homes’ in more than one location. They require 
interventions at both ‘homes’ as well as in transit; 
• Itinerant or mobile populations, who either have no ‘home’ or who spend 
most of their time away from home (truckers, seafarers, CSWs, construc-
tion workers). Perhaps the most difficult to reach, as they do not consti-
tute a spatially fixed community, these people require interventions that 
mirror their movements, for example condoms at truck stops, education 
material on buses, mobile clinics and so on;
• Temporarily displaced communities such as refugees and internally dis-
placed persons. Interventions require rapid response in highly mobile 
form, especially in conditions where the very circumstances forcing peo-
ple to move, such as war, simultaneously expose them to the threat of 
HIV infection. 
Infusing migrant communities with education, prevention, testing, treatment 
and care is the only realistic means of dealing with the current HIV/AIDS epi-
demic and containing its further spread. To further stigmatize or marginalize 
migrants, or even to ignore their particular HIV/AIDS intervention needs, serves 
only to strengthen the dangerous synergy between HIV/AIDS and migration. 
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.	 Migration	and	Food	Security
Impacts of out-migration on source areas vary considerably. Migration can be 
a response to poverty but, as Skeldon notes, the extremely poor are generally 
excluded from migration opportunities. While migration may reduce poverty it 
almost always enhances inequality, since migration is a selective process.128 
The major issue is what opportunities are available to which groups and 
whether the type of migratory work benefits migrants and their families by 
improving their assets and human capital.129
The links between migration and food security specifically need to be viewed 
at two levels. First, at a more general level, there is the question of whether 
migration facilitates or undermines the overall food security of rural and urban 
populations. Second, there is the more specific question of the food security of 
migrants themselves and how this is secured. 
As indicated above, flows of migrants are increasingly complex. In general, 
however, households in SEA use migration as a survival and accumulation 
strategy, along with income diversification. Krokfors views migration as a 
response to poverty and environmental stress, and uses the term ‘multi-active 
households’ to describe households which engage in different income generat-
ing activities.130 One characteristic of these changes is risk spreading or risk 
management on the part of households as they engage in multiple modes 
of livelihood to improve their standard of living or to just survive. Jamal and 
Weeks refer to this as the ‘trader-cum-wage earner-cum-shamba growing’ 
class.131 Tacoli notes emerging higher levels of multi-activity, notably among 
younger generations, and an increase in mobility accompanied by strong social 
and economic links with home areas. Typically, therefore, households are now 
spatially “stretched” between rural and urban areas.
There is now what Frayne terms a ‘complex system of cyclical or reciprocal 
migration between rural and urban areas.’ This has led to an increased inter-
dependency of rural and urban systems and ‘reciprocal urbanization’ where 
movement of people and goods back and forth is supported by enhanced 
communications and transportation.132 Owuro postulates that the terms ‘multi-
spatial households’ and ‘multiple-home households’ are not as appropriate as 
‘multi-spatial livelihoods’ since different income-generating activities in dif-
ferent geographical locales does not necessarily imply a divided household. 
‘Multi-spatial livelihood’ means that a household has both urban and rural 
sources of food and income.133 In one study of households with multi-spatial 
livelihoods, households which combined crop production with marketing, and 
several non-farm and off-farm income-generating activities were found to be 
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the most successful economically and the most food secure.134
The impact of migration on rural agriculture is also a key consideration.135 
The relationship is complicated by numerous other factors. De Haan, for 
example, notes that the impact is dependent on “the context, on seasonality 
of movement, educational levels of migrants, the length of time spent away, 
assets, and social structures and institutions allowing – in case of single male 
migration – women and others to pursue activities previously reserved for men 
and household heads.”136 Logically, if migration deprives rural areas of labour 
and impacts negatively on production, then it is likely to increase the food 
insecurity of rural populations. In Central Mali, for example, absent young men 
were sorely missed, especially by the smallest households, and remittances 
were seen as poor substitutes for young men’s labour.137 In a Malawi study, 
45% of women were performing tasks once handled by men, but women were 
quite over-burdened and did not receive enough remittances to hire labour.138 
In his study on migration and food security in Namibia, Frayne identifies dis-
tress migration where children from urban homes are sent to stay with rela-
tives elsewhere because households did not have enough money to support 
the children in Windhoek. Another form of distress migration is to send adult 
members to the rural areas, either as returnees or new migrants in situations 
where few in the household are employed. This reduces the need for the urban 
household to “ration food, sell assets, borrow food or money, or engage in 
crime to survive.”139
The picture is further complicated by two factors: first, absent migrants are 
not food consumers which may decrease the pressure on the consumption lev-
els of the household. Second, migrants who have gainful employment or other 
income-generating activity in town commonly send remittances home. There 
is some evidence that remittances from urban to rural areas are declining.140 
But the fundamental question is what rural households do with remittances 
in cash and kind. Are these remittances invested in rural agriculture and other 
productive income-generating activity? The evidence from a recent study by 
SAMP of remittance usage in 6 SADC countries found that in general they 
are not. Looking at household averages for all countries, food and groceries 
are by far the most important (93% of households) followed by transportation 
(44%), fuel (44%), utilities (38%), education (31%) and medical expenses 
(30%). Certain categories of expenses are more important in certain countries. 
Education (primarily school fees) is important in Zimbabwe (57% of house-
holds) and Mozambique (44%); medical expenses are important in Zimbabwe 
(40%), Swaziland (39%) and Mozambique (31%); and savings are important 
in Zimbabwe (36%) and Botswana (28%). Housing is a major category only in 
Zimbabwe (46%); as is clothing in Lesotho (73%) and Zimbabwe (54%); and 
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farming expenses in Swaziland (39%). This tends to confirm other evidence 
that women in Swaziland were able to increase agricultural production through 
a combination of remittances from absent males and through government pro-
vision of a tractor-rental service.141
When the amount spent by category is compared across countries, the 
largest amounts were spent on building (R576), farming (R434), clothes 
(R267), food (R288), and special events (R239). Building is the largest 
median expense category in all five countries with food expenses second in 
Lesotho (R400) and Mozambique (R251), third in Botswana (R346), fourth 
in Zimbabwe (R64) and fifth in Swaziland (R300). However, looking only at 
the amount spent on such items as building and special events skews the 
picture because these expenses affect relatively few households. When the 
weighted value of expenditure items is compared, the major importance of 
food as an expense category is revealed. It is the most important expense item 
in all five countries. The three most important items by country in 1000s of 
rands are: Botswana: food (R186), clothes (R33), fuel (R31); Lesotho: food 
(R377), clothes (R371), special events (R75); Mozambique: food (R124), 
clothes (R24), building (R22); Swaziland: food (R281), farming (R232), edu-
cation (R116); and Zimbabwe: food (R40), education (R18), building (R15). 
Depending on the country, between 2 and 6 times more money is spent on 
food than the next most important expense item which highlights the impor-
tance of the food expense for migrant-sending households. In other words, the 
evidence to hand suggests that migrant remittances are not generally invested 
in farming but used primarily to purchase food to increase the food security of 
rural household members. 
As noted above, there is scattered evidence from throughout SEA that food 
transfers from rural to urban areas are well-established and even increasing in 
volume. Frayne, for example, found that the percentage of urban households 
which received food regularly was higher than the percentage of those who 
remitted cash to rural extended family members. In Harare, Drakakis-Smith 
reported that 20% of respondents received gifts of food from rural areas.142 In 
Dakar, Senegal, there was also a considerable flow of both food and cash from 
rural to urban homes.143 In Kenya, rural crop cultivation far exceeded urban 
cultivation in its contribution to the energy requirements of urban residents in 
Nakuru.144 This research supports the general tenet that transfers of food, and 
sometimes cash, from rural to urban areas are on the increase and that the 
balance of favour is moving to the urban side. 
The second area of focus in unraveling the connections between migra-
tion and food security concerns the situation of migrants themselves. Does 
migration itself have a positive or negative impact on the access of migrants 
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in urban areas to quality food? This question requires much further research. 
One area which has received some attention is the issue of urban food produc-
tion (or urban agriculture). Within urban and peri-urban areas, there has been 
an increase in urban agriculture (UA) since the late 1970s. As real wages 
have declined over time, and as imported food prices have risen, many urban 
residents have turned to UA. Ellis and Sumberg145 summarize the reasons for 
engaging in UA as follows:
• as a means of survival for the very poor;
• as a personal strategy for women to meet part of family food security 
needs in the context of insufficient, uncertain or unstable cash allocations 
by male wage earners within the household;146
• as a contribution to food security in general;
• as a substitute for cash purchases of food, especially for higher priced 
food such as eggs, meat, milk, fruit and vegetables so that cash can be 
used for other items;147
• as a means to supplement cash earnings of the family and meet other 
objectives such as children’s schooling;148
• as a commercial rather than subsistence activity.
Many engage in UA for a combination of reasons and these are not mutu-
ally exclusive. Some studies have found that many high and middle-income 
households tend to engage in UA, usually for commercial reasons. In a study 
based on Gabarone, Hovorka makes the argument that UA plays a very impor-
tant entrepreneurial role which increases the agency of urban dwellers.149 
In Nairobi, Freeman finds that UA is dominated by women who are divided 
into those who farm for subsistence and those who farm for cash income.150 
However, poorer households, which include newly arrived migrants, are often 
excluded from access to land due to both formal and informal gatekeeping 
within the city.151 The question therefore arises as to the extent to which 
migrants participate in UA and its benefits.
In general, rural-urban migration has been thought to improve the personal 
food security of the individual migrant. In some sectors, such as mining and 
plantation agriculture, this is clearly the case. The mines and estates have an 
interest in maintaining a well-fed workforce and provide regular and nutritious 
meals as a supplement to wages. Similarly, migrants in the services sector are 
likely to have access to cheap, good quality food. On the other hand, migrants 
working in sectors such as construction and industry may have to spend a 
disproportionate part of their wage envelope on food. Migrants in employment 
or self-employment are certainly not individual consumers. Many have depend-
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ents in urban areas and pool resources into a “common pot” to sustain the 
urban half of the split household (or a separate urban household with another 
partner and dependents). Although migrants are largely dependent on cash pur-
chases for food, urban food prices (particularly where there is a thriving informal 
sector) may be lower than in rural areas. However, the evidence suggests that 
poor urban households, including migrants, spend a disproportionate amount 
of their income on food. If there is strong pressure to remit, they may be more 
vulnerable to going short themselves.
New forms of urbanization and migration are clearly emerging. They reflect 
complex demographic, social and commodity exchanges, based on reciprocity 
and reciprocal migration. Food transfers are vital to urban food security at the 
household level. Remittance transfers are equally vital to food security in many 
rural areas. Households with weak ties to rural families and without access 
to rural land to cultivate, including the poorest urban households and some 
female headed households, are the most vulnerable to deprivation and gener-
ally live under severe risk of hunger.
.	 HIV/AIDS	and	Food	Security
At a biological level, macro- and micro-nutrients play a critical role in the 
immune response to infectious diseases and survival. Since HIV directly 
attacks the immune system, HIV and malnutrition work in tandem:
HIV compromises nutritional status and this in turn increases sus-
ceptibility to opportunistic infections. Malnutrition, on the other 
hand, exacerbates the effects of HIV by further weakening the 
immune system. Clinical studies show that HIV disease progression 
is more rapid in individuals with compromised nutrition.152
Within HIV-affected households, there is increased risk of food insecu-
rity and malnutrition as sick members are unable to work, income declines, 
expenditure on health care increases, care-giving burdens increase and there 
is less time for looking after children.153 The concept of nutrition security has 
also come forward as a key dimension in the prevention, care, treatment and 
mitigation of HIV/AIDS. A household can be viewed as nutrition secure when 
access to a variety of food is accompanied by a sanitary environment, adequate 
health services and adequate care to ensure a healthy life for all household 
members.154
At the community level, because HIV/AIDS strikes the most economically 
active and because it is so widespread, the impact is not just across sectors, 
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but significantly systematic.155 In assessing the impact on agriculture, the FAO 
suggests that if four people for each of the 42 million people living with HIV are 
impacted, the virus will affect 160 million globally. The resulting humanitarian 
crisis would be especially acute in Southern Africa, where many countries have 
prevalence rates over 17%. By 2020, Namibia could lose up to 26% of its 
agricultural force due to HIV/AIDS, Zimbabwe 23%, Mozambique and South 
Africa 20% and Malawi 14%.156 Table 7 shows the impacts HIV/AIDS has on 
agricultural systems and household food security.
Table 7: Common Impacts of HIV/AIDS on Agriculture
How HIV/AIDS changes the  
context of agricultural growth
Leads to:
Labour changes: Less land being farmed
Shortage of household labour due to:
Mortality
Surviving adults doing care-giving
Shortage of hired labour due to:
Mortality
Migration to cities
Lack of cash to pay for it
Underfarming of land
More child labour
Less labour-intensive crops grown
Emphasis on small livestock and cash crops
Greater emphasis on small livestock cultivation
Decline in marketed output for crop processors
Natural resource mining (the future is heavily 
discounted)
Loss of farm-specific knowledge:
Premature mortality curtails period 
for intergenerational role modeling 
and knowledge transfer
Less appropriate farming practices within a 
more hostile farming environment
More inexperienced farmers who need  
training, role models (e.g. youth)
Income changes:
Fewer earners, increase in  
dependency ratio
More off-farm income sources
Greater expenditure on medical,  
transport, special needs of ill
Migration
Institutional and organizational 
changes:
Loss of institutional knowledge, high 
turnover, low investment in staff 
development
Weaker rural institutions (e.g. extension  
services, microfinance institutions, NGOs)
Weaker social capital
Weakening of property rights for some
Weakening of asset base of women  
(especially land)
Source: Haddad and Gillespie (2005)157
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As Table 7 illustrates, the impact of HIV/AIDS is not only immediate, but 
cumulative and far-reaching. As social capital erodes, youth are left untrained 
and unprepared for agricultural production and decisions related to the future. 
The average life expectancy in SSA is now 47 years, an average of 15 years 
lower than it would be without HIV/AIDS.158 In addition, young people are 
inheriting debts and are forced to increase cultivation in order to try to feed 
more dependents without much knowledge of agricultural techniques, indig-
enous knowledge, and biodiversity and without much chance of accessing 
credit and knowledge through community or state institutions.159 The loss of 
indigenous knowledge and biodiversity is critical, since these are major assets 
which become even more important as other tangible resources diminish 
within affected rural communities.160
All of the above factors have resulted in a decline in production. For exam-
ple, a study conducted in Zimbabwe found that output on smallholder farms 
decreased by 29% for cattle, 49% for vegetables and 61% for maize for 
households which had experienced an AIDS-related death.161 Altogether, maize 
production had dropped 54%.162 Cassava production has steadily increased 
over a five year period and replaced more labour-intensive crops such as maize 
in an attempt to compensate for lost labour through HIV/AIDS in Malawi, 
Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe.163 Foods which are easier to cultivate 
are often poorer nutritionally and many households also resort to skipping 
meals. In addition, households suffer loss of livestock as they are used for 
sources of food during funerals of relatives who have died from HIV/AIDS.164 
Illness or death has an immediate impact on households. In western Kenya, 
Onyango et al. found that death-affected households spent an average of $462 
per year, compared with $199 for illness-affected households and $21 for non-
affected households. With this amount of cash tied up in illness and death, 
households were less able to invest in agricultural inputs: illness-affected and 
death-affected households spent 56% and 61% respectively of the amount 
spent by non-affected households on agricultural inputs.165
In considering the likely consequences of HIV/AIDS on the agricultural sec-
tor of the hardest hit countries in SEA, Jayne et al. predict that AIDS-related 
labour shortages may induce labour migration from the urban informal sector 
into agriculture. They also suggest that for poorer, smallholder households, 
land will remain a key constraint on income growth. For highly afflicted rural 
communities, AIDS-induced decapitalization in the form of loss of savings, cat-
tle assets, draft equipment and other assets may become the greatest limits on 
rural productivity and livelihoods for these communities.166
Human capital is depleted, resources are diverted away from agriculture 
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and there is a loss of both farm and non-farm income. There are also the 
psychosocial impacts of witnessing the illness and death of spouses and par-
ents and of facing possible destitution.167 When these factors combine, the 
lack of food and lack of access to food intensify. De Waal terms this the ‘new 
variant famine’ since it targets productive adults and more women than men 
rather than children and the elderly who are the traditional victims of fam-
ines.168 Within communities, women and girls assume care-giving roles which 
takes time away from productive tasks. Women are the most vulnerable to 
HIV/AIDS infection and also to the economic impact of HIV/AIDS.169 Younger 
girls are also highly susceptible and may be forced to leave school and assume 
care-giving roles and eventual care of younger siblings as parents die. All of 
this impacts upon the long-term development potential of women and girls.170 
In Zimbabwe, Senefeld and Polsky found that households with chronically ill 
adults were more likely to have their children drop out of school and more 
likely to resort to migration strategies in order to ‘cope’.171 The Southern African 
Regional Poverty Network (SARPN) asserts that the cycle of poverty and AIDS 
entrenches a system of chronic impoverishment: “[T]his weakened social fabric 
means that families cannot recover previous levels of social functioning, and 
may even resort to strategies that imperil them further, because the negative 
consequences of such remedies are not immediately apparent”.172
Figures 2 and 3 below portray scenarios with vulnerable and less vulnerable 
rural households, both of which experience the migrant male household head 
returning from an urban area with HIV. Both households eventually experi-
ence the death of the male household head. However, for the more vulner-
able household, this precipitates a downward spiral which ends with loss of 
the homestead, homelessness, destitution and the eventual breakup of the 
household unit. There, the male migrant had been the main cash earner and 
physical capital is lost as the household head weakens and dies. Through this 
process, savings have been used and precious assets sold off to pay for medi-
cal expenses, costs of care-giving and a funeral. With less cash and less time 
to farm, the family plants cassava rather than maize. This reduces the need for 
labour but is a less nutritious source of food, which exacerbates malnutrition 
and poor health. When the household is forced to sell off livestock, it is unable 
to recover its herd and thus its assets are diminished. This eliminates another 
source of protein as well. The household in Figure 2 is more vulnerable since 
it is unable to diversify sources of farm and non-farm income. In addition, 
dependency ratios increase with AIDS orphans joining the already struggling 
household. In a meta-analysis of national nutrition and health surveys in SSA 
over the past five years, households with more than one orphan were 3.2 times 
more likely to have claimed food insecurity and hunger than households with 
only one orphan or no orphans at all.173
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The widow may also be weakened if she contracts HIV or AIDS from her 
husband. The household’s situation is further exacerbated by insecurity of ten-
ure. The youth will attempt to farm, but without the training and knowledge 
of farming techniques, traditional methods and biodiversity knowledge which 
normally would be passed on by their parents. Social capital is lost without 
serious intervention. All of this leads to food insecurity, malnutrition and poor 
health. At some point, the widow or her daughters may be forced into risky sur-
vival strategies just to provide food for the household, further perpetuating the 
HIV/AIDS cycle. If the household loses the homestead, they are propelled into 
destitution and are forced to seek out work and shelter; this situation would 
likely lead to the disintegration of the household. Gillespie maintains that land 
acquisition by better-off households will likely increase as widows and orphans 
fail to keep access and/or ownership rights to land after the husband/father 
dies and may thus lose the chance to rent out the land as another source of 
income. “The AIDS epidemic is thus intertwined with the way in which power, 
authority, value and opportunity are distributed within societies.”174
Figure 2: Vulnerable Rural Household
The less vulnerable household in Figure 3 is able to increase off-farm pro-
duction and to access remittances from two urban migrants. This helps the 
household to maintain crop production, proper nutrition and food security. 
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Here also, a female relative migrates to help the household with chores and 
children. Even though orphans join the household, the burden of care is shared 
and there is enough food to avoid insecurity. In this situation, security of tenure 
also ensures household and food security and thus risky survival strategies can 
be avoided. The two urban migrants would also be able to benefit from food 
remittances from the household.
Figure 3: More Diversified and Less Vulnerable Rural Household
As noted in previous sections, rural and urban households are inexorably 
intertwined socially and economically. When HIV/AIDS affects households 
in either or both locales, food and livelihood security is compromised. HIV 
increases vulnerability to food insecurity, which increases vulnerability to 
HIV infection and thus HIV can be seen as a shock to household security.175 
Gillespie et al. describe HIV as a ‘unique, slow-moving and devastating 
shock.’176 When households are stripped of livelihood assets, Mdladla et al. 
term this a ‘creeping emergency’ which progressively diminishes the lives and 
livelihoods of affected households.177
Research on the impact of HIV/AIDS on households in Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe reveals that HIV-related morbidity and mortality increases vulner-
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ability to food insecurity and causes earlier engagement in distress strategies 
in response to food insecurity, particularly on the part of poor households.178 
Even though HIV/AIDS affected households might temporarily avoid destitution 
through various response strategies, in the end they may not be able to avoid 
a long-term downward spiral in food security and may never recover from the 
shock.179 Compared with strategies adopted by other households facing other 
shocks, the cumulative effect on households impacted by HIV/AIDS may be 
permanent since these coping strategies are more likely to be irreversible.180 
For example, following a shock to household income, households in Malawi 
affected by HIV/AIDS took up to 18 months to stabilize, with a new equilibrium 
income that was about half the pre-shock income levels.181 As HIV infection 
rates increase, more households could be food secure on a permanent basis, 
leading to increased malnutrition. This not only threatens the resilience of food 
insecure households, but reduced ability to respond may hasten the onset of 
famine conditions.182 
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.1	 Conceptualizing	the	Links	between		
	 Migration,	HIV/AIDS	and	Urban	Food		
	 Security
As established above, the social and economic relationship between rural and 
urban areas is symbiotic, and food transfers to urban migrants can exceed 
urban cash remittances, although remittances remain crucial to rural produc-
tion. However, HIV/AIDS is undermining and weakening physical and social 
capital in both rural and urban areas, particularly amongst poorer households. 
Although migration is a key element of the new social economy, it is also a 
significant vector of HIV/AIDS.
The linkages between migration, food security and HIV/AIDS constitute a 
complex web of causal connections and feedback mechanisms. For example, 
HIV/AIDS is a disease that demonstrably impacts rural food production. Not 
only does this compromise the food security of rural producers, it could reduce 
the flow of food from countryside to town (thus making the urban-based 
migrant more vulnerable to food insecurity). At the same time, the rural house-
hold becomes more dependent on cash earnings and remittances for survival, 
increasing the pressure for remittances. New forms of return “distress” migra-
tion to rural areas, simultaneously increasing the burden of provision on the 
rural household. Again, if the migrant is expected or forced to remit a greater 
proportion of his or her urban pay packet to compensate for declining agricul-
tural production, their own ability to purchase food may be reduced. Given 
that migrants spend a large proportion of their wages on necessities such as 
food, their own diet could suffer. Migrants with HIV/AIDS themselves are, over 
DIRECTIONS
AND	
PRIORITIES

Chapter	
time and in the absence of ART, likely to be less able to work to full capacity 
and to remit. The problem here is that migrants are, by most accounts, more 
vulnerable to HIV infection. 
In the absence of definitive research, one way of conceptualizing the links 
between migration, rural/urban food security and HIV/AIDS is through a more 
systematic modeling of the potential connections and feedback loops. Figure 
4, for example, suggests a set of connections between poverty, urbanization, 
food insecurity, risky survival strategies and HIV/AIDS. This model is a use-
ful programmatic statement of the potential linkages in the urban setting. 
However, it does not systematically integrate the rural end of the migration 
spectrum which, as this paper has argued, is also essential to understanding 
urban food security. 
Figure 4: Links Between Urban Food Insecurity and HIV/AIDS
For the poor urban migrant in a cash intensive environment, HIV/AIDS will 
also potentially propel them into a downward spiral. As Figure 5 shows, with 
physical capital loss, the migrant will lose capacity to work for cash, which 
means they will increasingly be unable to meet basic needs, including food. 
More than likely, food consumption will be the first item to be reduced as cash 
and savings diminish. The ability of the migrant to engage in urban agriculture 
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will be limited due to their loss of energy and poor health. With less cash for 
survival, the migrant will be forced to stop remitting altogether or to reduce 
amounts sent to the rural extended family, placing that family at risk with 
respect to cash needed for agricultural input and basic needs. If food transfers 
from the rural family have been reduced, or if food has inferior nutritional 
quality, the migrant will have less access to nutritious food just when their 
body needs decent nutrition. These conditions will exacerbate conditions of 
malnutrition and poor health and will lead to food insecurity. 
Figure 5: Linkages between HIV/AIDS, Migration and Food Security
The urban household would be forced to use up savings, sell valuable assets, 
or borrow money at high interest rates. Dependency would increase on rural 
and urban based extended family members, without the ability to reciprocate. 
In the context of food insecurity and deprivation, household members would 
be highly likely to engage in risky survival strategies, further exacerbating the 
HIV/AIDS cycle. As the migrant is further debilitated from HIV/AIDS, they will 
be forced to leave the city and return home to the rural areas for continuous 
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care. This places a further burden on the rural household, not only with respect 
to burden of care and the required use of assets, but also with loss of urban 
remittances for agricultural production. If the rural household is vulnerable, 
this could start a downward cycle resulting in increased participation in risky 
survival strategies, perpetuation of the HIV/AIDS cycle, and ultimate destitu-
tion. 
The new social economy which is underpinned by migration will be seri-
ously compromised unless appropriate interventions – driven by praxis oriented 
research and policy – can be undertaken within the framework of rural and 
urban food production and access to food to break the vicious cycle of HIV/
AIDS, migration and food insecurity. The balance between cash remittances 
from urban migrants and food transfers from rural households is a delicate one 
for impoverished, vulnerable households. Thus, if urban migrants are able to 
access food without compromising other basic needs, this would improve the 
health of the migrant as well as reinforce the balance between cash remittanc-
es for rural production and survival and food transfers to the urban migrant.
.	 Towards	a	Synthesis
This publication has highlighted the high urbanization rates and increasing 
rural-urban linkages in the region, both domestic and cross-border, and dem-
onstrated that rural and urban food security is highly interdependent. It has 
been further argued that HIV/AIDS has a direct negative impact on urban food 
security, most notably through the consequent reduction in physical capital 
and production of food in rural areas and increased burden of dependence 
of HIV-positive individuals on both urban and rural social units. This precipi-
tates a deepening of poverty at the household level. Yet the three-way link-
age between migration, HIV/AIDS and urban food security has yet to be fully 
researched and understood. 
Within this context, there is a need for research-informed interventions to 
improve the conditions for poor households to create greater food security 
opportunities and to mitigate the negative impacts of HIV/AIDS on the sustain-
ability of livelihoods in urban centres in Southern and Eastern Africa. However, 
as the knowledge gaps articulated below make clear, there are contextual 
variations across the region, and it should be expected that this heterogeneous 
geography will be reflected in the research outcomes. Developing typologies 
will therefore be central to the ability of research to contribute meaningfully 
to the growing need for greater support to poor households and to scale up 
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interventions by understanding contextual needs and allowing intervention rep-
lication to take place. By so doing, not only is the potential impact of research 
region-wide, but the outcomes may be useful as international public goods for 
adaptation to other contexts in which the triple threat of migration, HIV/AIDS 
and food insecurity is playing itself out (for example, in India). 
Emerging from the review, it is possible to identify at least four key knowl-
edge gaps in relation to the three interrelated elements of migration, HIV/AIDS 
and urban food security within SEA, as follows:
a)  Typologies of Reciprocity: Different patterns and systems of urban-rural 
linkages (migration) at the household level and the economic and nutri-
tional impacts on household food security (quantifying the dimensions of 
the new social economy of migration).
b)  Typologies of Risk: Different patterns and systems of urban-rural linkages 
(migration) at the household level and the differentiated impacts of HIV 
and AIDS on household food security (effects on resistance, susceptibility 
and resilience of households to HIV and AIDS).
c)  Typologies of Coping: Impacts of HIV and AIDS on household food secu-
rity strategies within the context of urban-rural linkages (changes, diver-
sification strategies and the role of migration).
d)  Typologies of Intervention: Design of appropriate and supportive policy 
and programming interventions to address the development challenges 
posed by the triple threat of migration, HIV/AIDS and food insecurity. 
The general research question can be stated as follows:
How does the mobility of people and urban-rural linkages affect the spread of 
HIV and the impacts of AIDS on food and nutrition security?
Within the broad aim of addressing this question and documenting similari-
ties and differences between contexts within the region, the following research 
questions provide a starting point for understanding the interactions between 
migration, HIV/AIDS and food and nutrition security:
a)  What is the contribution of rural food production at the household level 
to the food budget of urban households?
b)  To what extent is HIV/AIDS impacting both rural and urban household 
food security?
c)  How and to what degree are these impacts magnified or ameliorated by 
rural-urban migration and rural-urban linkages at the household level?
d)  What role does urban agriculture play, together with other coping strate-
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gies, in meeting the food gap of urban households, and is this influenced 
by HIV and AIDS?
e)  Based on the research findings, what policy and programming interven-
tions are required to address the development challenges posed by the 
triple threat of migration, HIV/AIDS and food insecurity?
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